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The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) instituted
deportation proceedings against Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca, a
Nicaraguan national, after her non-immigration visa expired and
she failed to voluntarily depart the United States.1 At her deporta-
tion hearing Cardoza-Fonseca conceded that she was subject to de-
portation, but requested political asylum pursuant to section
208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended
(INA),' or, in the alternative,' withholding of deportation under
1. The outcome of the INS proceeding appears at Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Appendix C, at 25a, filed 54 U.S.L.W.
3413 (U.S. Nov. 5 1985) (No. 85-782) (decision of the United States Immigration Judge)
[hereinafter INS proceeding].
2. INA § 208(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982)) provides:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically
present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of
such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in
the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that
such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) of this title.
INA § 101(a)(42) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982)) provides in perti-
nent part:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of
such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
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section 243(h) of the INA.4 Cardoza-Fonseca claimed that if de-
ported to Nicaragua, she would be persecuted by the Sandinistas
for her political opinions and as retaliation against her politically-
active anti-Sandinista brother, with whom she had fled Nicaragua.5
The immigration judge equated the standard of proof under sec-
tion 243(h) with that under section 208(a) and held that she failed
to demonstrate a clear probability of persecution and therefore was
not entitled to either form of relief 6 The Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) dismissed the appeal, affirming the conclusion that
Cardoza-Fonseca had failed to establish eligibility for either form
of relief, reasoning that its conclusion would be the same whether
it applied "a standard of 'clear probability,' 'good reason,' or 'real-
istic likelihood.' "'7 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed and remanded for reconsideration, instructing the BIA that
the legal standards for eligibility under sections 208(a) and 243(h)
are in fact different.8 The INS appealed.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the conflict among the circuit courts of appeal on the issue of
whether an alien's burden of proof for asylum under section 208(a)
is equivalent to his burden of proof for withholding deportation
under section 243(h).9 The Court held, affirmed: the decision below
holding that Congressional intent demonstrated by the plain
meaning of the statutory language, and structure of the forms of
relief under the Refugee Act compel the conclusion that the "well-
founded fear" standard which governs eligibility for asylum is not
identical nor equivalent to the "clear probability" standard which
governs eligibility for withholding of deportation. Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion . . ..
3. INS Proceeding, supra note 1, at 18a, 25a.
4. INA § 243(h)(1) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982)) provides, in
pertinent part:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien . . . to a country if
the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.
5. INS Proceeding, supra note 1, at 20a, 22a, 27a.
6. Id. at 27a-28a.
7. Id. at 21a.
8. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1984).
9. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 475 U.S. 1009 (1986).
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Cir. 1984), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
I. INTRODUCTION
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these, the hopeless tempest tossed to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door."1
No matter how much some may regard this country as an un-
limited safe harbor for homeless refugees, Congress has recog-
nized that certain limitations must exist, and that this country
can only accommodate so many immigrants in a given time
period."
The United States open-door policy toward refugees is limited
by the conditions and standards imposed by domestic and interna-
tional law. The Refugee Act of 1980 defined the standards and
conditions governing applications for asylum and withholding of
deportation. It also gave rise to a controversy surrounding the bur-
den of proof to be met by an alien under each type of claim. While
the decision in Cardoza-Fonseca resolved the conflict over the
equivalency of the burdens, it accomplishes nothing more than to
mandate the INS to remedy the misapplication of the two stan-
dards. The Court admits that it provides no guidance with the ap-
plication of the well-founded fear test. 2
This comment proposes an objective framework for the analy-
sis of asylum applications by using the factors discussed in the BIA
decision, In re Acosta.'3 With this framework in place, the authors
will discuss and analyze the type of qualitative evidence that has
afforded and should afford an alien a favorable grant of discretion
for political asylum. Finally, the authors will comment on the in-
herent problems of the existing process and the efficacy of the pro-
posed framework.
10. Emma Lazarus, Inscription on Statue of Liberty.
11. Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 580 (7th Cir. 1984).
12. See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
13. I. & N. Dec. No. 2986 (BIA March 1, 1985).
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II. FRAMEWORK: ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING DEPORTATION
PROCEDURES
The Refugee Act of 1980 amended the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 195214 (INA) by establishing a procedure for grant-
ing political asylum'5 and by redefining the existing procedure for
granting a withholding of deportation; 8 thereby making these two
procedures the principle forms of relief against deportation.1 7 Prior
to 1980, there was no procedure by which aliens already in the
United States could apply for asylum. 8 Consequently, requests for
asylum were treated on the same basis as requests for withholding
of deportation.
A. Asylum Under Section 208(a)
Section 208(a) of the INA, requires the Attorney General to
establish and administer a procedure for aliens to apply for asy-
lum. It authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant
asylum to aliens who qualify as refugees.19 Asylum, therefore, is a
discretionary remedy for deportation. 0 Eligibility is based on a de-
termination by the Attorney General that the alien qualifies as a
"refugee." A refugee is:
any person who is outside any country of such person's national-
ity or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwill-
ing to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
14. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1503
(1982)).
15. INA § 208(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982)).
16. INA § 243(h) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
17. The other forms of relief available include suspension of deportation, INA § 244(a)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982)); adjustment of status, INA § 245 (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982)); and voluntary departure, INA § 244(e) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982)).
18. In 1974 a regulation permitting aliens to apply for asylum was provided, 8 C.F.R. §
108 (1975), but was revoked following the creatinn of the procedure for granting asylum in
1980, pursuant to the Refugee Act of 1980 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503)
(1982 & Supp. 1984).
19. See supra note 2.
20. INA § 208(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982)) (an "alien may be
granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General"); 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(a) (1988) ("The
district director may approve or deny the asylum application in the exercise of discretion")
(emphasis supplied).
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account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion."
This definition triggered the controversial "well-founded fear of
persecution" standard.
An otherwise qualified applicant, however, is statutorily de-
nied asylum if it is determined that the alien: (1) has been "firmly
resettled" in a third country;"2 (2) has participated in the persecu-
tion of others;8  (3) has been convicted of a "particularly serious
crime" and "constitutes a danger" to the United States;2"' (4) is
considered to have committed a "serious nonpolitical crime"
abroad prior to entering the United States; 5 or (5) is regarded as a
"danger to the security" of the United States.2"
21. INA § 101(a)(42) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982)).
This definition is consistent with the definition prescribed by the United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees. Article 1(2) of the Protocol defines "refugee" as a person
who comes within the definition of article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Status
of Refugees. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention defines "refugee" as a person who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside of the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. No, 152.
22. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(ii) (1985) (there is no corresponding statutory bar to applications
for withholding deportation). INS regulations consider an alien "firmly resettled" if the
alien "was offered resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement
by another nation and travelled to and entered that nation as a consequence of his flight
from persecution .... " 8 C.F.R. § 208.14 (1985). Dispositive in the determination are the
types of housing and employment, and the rights to education, public relief, naturalization,
and permission to own property, made available to the alien. Id. For example, where such
rights are "substantially and consciously restricted" the alien is not firmly resettled. Por-
tales, 18 I. & N. Dec. 239, 242 (BIA 1982).
23. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(iii) (1985). In particular, § 208.8(f)(iii) denies relief to an
alien who "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any
other person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion." See also 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(A) (1982) (corresponding statu-
tory bar to applications for withholding deportation).
24. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(iv) (1985). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (1982) (correspond-
ing statutory bar to applications for withholding deportation).
25. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(v) (1985). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1982) (correspond-
ing statutory bar to applications for withholding deportation).
26. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(vi) (1985). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(D) (1982) (correspond-
ing statutory bar to applications for withholding deportation).
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B. Withholding of Deportation Under Section 243(h)
Section 243(h) of the INA, as amended by the Refugee Act of
1980, provides that the Attorney General must withhold the depor-
tation of any alien whose "life or freedom would be threatened" if
deported." To qualify for relief the applicant must demonstrate
that his "life or freedom would be threatened [if returned to such
country] on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. '2 8 Withholding of de-
portation is a non-discretionary remedy for deportation to the
country in which the threat exists. Because the remedy is in fact
country-specific, the United States may not necessarily become the
alien's country of refuge.29
The burden is on the alien to prove that there is a "clear
probability of persecution" if deported.30 In INS v. Stevic,31 the
Supreme Court interpreted the "clear probability of persecution"
standard to mean the alien must demonstrate that "it is more
likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution" if
returned to the country in question.82
Like political refugees, a qualified withholding of deportation
applicant is statutorily precluded relief if the alien: (1) partici-
pated in the persecution of others;33 (2) has been convicted of a
"particularly serious crime" and "constitutes a danger" to the
27. INA § 243(h)(1) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982)).
This standard is derived from the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees,
article 33.1:
no Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion.
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176 (emphasis supplied).
28. Id.
29. There are a number of cases in which deportation to one country was withheld but
the alien was deported to another country. See, e.g., Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311, 315 (BIA
1982) (withheld deportation to Afghanistan but deported to Pakistan); Portales, 18 I. & N.
Dec. 239, 242 (BIA 1982) (withheld deportation to Cuba but deported to Peru); Lam, 18 I. &
N. Dec. 15, 18 (BIA 1981) (withheld deportation to China but deported to Hong Kong).
30. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984).
31. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407.
32. Id. at 429-30.
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(A) (1982). In particular, this section precludes relief if "the
alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any other




United States;3 ' (3) is considered to have committed a "serious
nonpolitical crime" abroad prior to entering the United States;3 or
(4) is regarded as a "danger to the security" of the United States.3
For those aliens who obtain political asylum, there are distinct
benefits not available to aliens eligible only for a withholding of
deportation.3 7 For example, a refugee may be eligible for employ-
ment authorization 8 and for adjustment of status to that of per-
manent resident after one year, provided that numerical limita-
tions allow it. 3 9 Consequently, a refugee who obtains permanent
residence may not be deported to any country,"' while an alien
whose deportation merely is withheld may be subsequently de-
ported to a country where he or she would not be subject to
persecution. 1
In order to fully establish a framework in which to discuss the
Supreme Court's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca, it is helpful to re-
view the status of the law regarding the question of equivalency of
the standards prior to the Court's decision in March 1987. Of par-
ticular importance is the Supreme Court's decision in Stevic, the
position adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the
conflicting application of those views by the Circuit Courts of
Appeals.
In 1984, the Supreme Court considered the proper standard of
proof to govern applications for withholding of deportation under
section 243(h). "' The Court rejected the contention that the "well-
founded fear" standard of section 208(a) governed applications for
withholding of deportation under section 243(h), finding no sup-
port for that conclusion "in either the language of section 243(h),
the structure of the amended Act, or the legislative history."' 3 The
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (1982).
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1982).
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(D) (1982).
37. Although not a benefit per se, a request for asylum made after the initiation of
deportation proceedings is also considered a request for withholding deportation. See 8
C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1988). The obverse is not available.
38. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 (1988) provides that "[u]pon the filing of a non-frivolous 1-589
[application for asylum], the district director may, in his discretion, grant a request by the
applicant for employment authorization."
39. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 209.1-209.2 (1988).
40. See INA §§ 208, 209 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1159 (1982)); 8
C.F.R. § 209.2 (1988).
41. See INA § 243(h) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
42. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
43. Id. at 428.
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Court held that an alien is entitled to withholding of deportation
only upon a showing that "persecution is more likely than not."
44
On the question of whether the same standard should govern
applications for asylum, the Court specifically reserved its decision,
stating, "We do not decide the meaning of the phrase 'well-
founded fear of persecution' which is applicable by the terms of
the Act and regulations to requests for discretionary asylum. That
issue is not presented by this case."4 However, for purposes of the
case, the Court expressly assumed "that the well-founded fear
standard is more generous than the clear-probability-of-persecu-
tion standard."46 Although it did not decide the question, the
Court recognized that there exists a difference between the stan-
dards and thereby foreshadowed its holding in Cardoza-Fonseca.
Technically, by not specifically reversing the Second Circuit's con-
clusion that the standards were in fact different, the Supreme
Court implicitly approved the conclusion and preserved it as good
law in that Circuit.
47
In 1985, the BIA addressed the question of the appropriate
standard for asylum and gave meaning to the term "well-founded
fear.' 48 Notwithstanding the Stevic Court's express assumption
that the standard of proof for asylum was "more generous" than
the standard governing withholding of deportation, the BIA, in
Acosta, found "no meaningful distinction between a standard re-
quiring a showing that persecution is likely to occur [i.e., asylum]
and a standard requiring a showing that persecution is more likely
than not to occur [i.e., withholding of deportation].' '4 9 Accordingly,
the BIA concluded that "the standards for asylum and withholding
of deportation are not meaningfully different and, in practical ap-
plication converge."50
Pre-Stevic decisions in many of the Courts of Appeals equated
the standards for establishing eligibility for asylum and withhold-
ing of deportation. 1 In some instances, the courts applied the
stricter clear probability standard of section 243(h) to all applica-
44. Id.
45. Id. at 430.
46. Id. at 426.
47. See Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 63 (2nd Cir. 1986).
48. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. No. 2986 (BIA Mar. 1, 1985).
49. Id. at 25.
50. Id.




tions, while in others, the courts applied the "more generous" well-
founded fear. For the most part, however, the confusion was
cleared by Stevic.
Post-Stevic, the Circuit Courts of Appeals, with the exception
of the Third Circuit, unequivocally held that the standard of proof
pursuant to section 208(a) for asylum is not equivalent to that for
withholding of deportation pursuant to section 243(h).52
III. INS v. CARDOZA-FONSECA
Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca entered the United States at
Miami, Florida on June 25, 1979.5a A 38-year-old single female na-
tive and citizen of Nicaragua, she arrived as a non-immigrant visi-
tor authorized to stay until September 30, 1979.24 She remained
beyond the authorized period without permission from INS. Upon
discovery of her unauthorized stay, she was confronted by the INS.
Rather than commence deportation proceedings, she was permit-
ted to voluntarily depart the United States by September 28,
1980.15 Instead she choose to remain. Her refusal to cooperate and
return to Nicaragua caused deportation proceedings to be insti-
tuted against her in March 1981.56
A. Deportation Hearing
A deportation hearing was conducted on December 14, 1981,
before U.S. Immigration Judge Bernard J. Hornbach." At this
point, Cardoza-Fonseca conceded that she was subject to deporta-
tion as a non-immigrant who had remained longer than permit-
ted.58 She defended against her deportation by applying for politi-
cal asylum under section 208(a) of the Refugee Act of 1980, for a
52. Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60 (2nd Cir. 1986); Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786
F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1565 (1987); Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767
F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985); Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1984); Carvajal-
Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984).
53. INS Proceeding, supra note 1, at 25a.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. INS Proceeding, supra note 1.
57. Id. at 24a, 28a.
58. Id. at 25a. Under § 241(a)(2) of the INA (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(2) (1982)), any alien shall be deported if the alien:
(2) entered the United States without inspection or at any time or place other
than as designated by the Attorney General or is in the United States in viola-
tion of this chapter or in violation of any other law of the United States.
[Vol. 19:3
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withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the INA, or, for
voluntary departure under section 244(e)5" of the INA.6
In support of her applications, Cardoza-Fonseca claimed that
if forced to return to Nicaragua she would be imprisoned and tor-
tured because of her political opinions and close relationship to her
brother, Orlando Cardoza-Fonseca, with whom she fled Nicara-
gua. 1 At the deportation hearing, he was called to testify about his
political experiences and confrontations with the ruling Sandinista
regime.2 He recounted his history of imprisonment and torture at
the hands of Somozan officials.63 In conclusion, he contended that
if she was returned, his sister would be imprisoned and
interrogated."
Because Cardoza-Fonseca conceded her deportability, the only
question left for the immigration judge involved Cardoza-Fonseca's
eligibility for withholding of deportation and political asylum. The
judge found that the legal standards for these type of applications
were identical. Thus, Cardoza-Fonseca would need to prove that
"under the circumstances" there was a "clear probability of perse-
cution directed to her individually."'63 In the judge's assessment,
there existed "no evidence of any substance in the record other
than her brother's claim for asylum." 6 Cardoza-Fonseca had failed
to demonstrate a clear probability that she would be persecuted in
Nicaragua. 7 Accordingly, the judge denied the applications for
asylum and withholding of deportation, but granted her permission
to voluntarily depart.68 Cardoza-Fonseca appealed to the Board of
Immigration Appeals.
59. INA § 244(e) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982)), provides in perti-
nent part:
The Attorney General may, in his discretion, permit any alien under depor-
tation proceedings ... to depart voluntarily from the United States at his own
expense in lieu of deportation if such alien shall establish to the satisfaction of
the Attorney General that he is, and has been, a person of good moral character
for at least five years immediately preceding his application for voluntary depar-
ture under this subsection.
60. INS Proceeding, supra note 1, at Isa, 25a.
61. Id. at 20a, 22a, 27a.
62. Id. at 27a.
63. Id. at 19a-20a.
64. Id. at 20a.
65. Id. at 27a.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 27a-28a.
1988]
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B. Board of Immigration Appeals
On appeal, Cardoza-Fonseca urged the BIA to find that "the
immigration judge had applied the wrong legal standard in arrivng
at his conclusion that she failed to sustain her burden of proving a
likelihood of persecution in Nicaragua."6 The BIA, however, af-
firmed the decision. The Board articulated the standard in terms
of Cardoza-Fonseca's failure to demonstrate that she "would suffer
persecution within the meaning of section 208(a) or 243(h)."'7 0
In reviewing the record, the BIA noted that Cardoza-Fonseca
admitted she had never been politically active or singled out for
persecution by the government, and had not taken action against
the past or present Nicaraguan governments nor assisted her
brother in any of his political activities.71 The BIA concluded that
her fear of retaliation and reprisal based on her relationship with
her brother was "mere speculation; ' 72 especially since Cardoza-
Fonseca had failed to support her assertions through objective
evidence."
Thus, the BIA found she "failed to show that she will be per-
secuted or that she has a well-founded fear of persecution" neces-
sary to qualify for withholding of deportation or for asylum.7 4 As to
the propriety of the standard of proof, the BIA declared that its
conclusion would be the same whether it applied "a standard of
'clear probability,' 'good reason,' or 'realistic likelihood.'"" The
Board dismissed the appeal, affirming the denial of her application
for asylum and withholding of deportation.76 Cardoza-Fonseca ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
C. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
In the Court of Appeals, Cardoza-Fonseca narrowed the issues
69. Id. at 18a.
70. Id. at 21a.
71. Id. at 22a.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 21a. The only "objective" evidence in the record was an article from a Nicara-
guan newspaper which recounted Orlando Cardoza-Fonseca's confrontations with govern-
ment officials. Id. at 20a. The article was attached to his application for asylum. Id. The
remainder of the evidence was testimony by Luz Maria Cardoza-Fonseca and her brother,
and a letter from their sister in Nicaragua.
74. Id. at 21a-22a.
75. Id. at 21a.
76. Id. at 18a, 22a.
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on appeal by contesting only the BIA's decision that she was not
eligible for asylum.7 7 She did not challenge the decision on her eli-
gibility for withholding of deportation. In determining her eligibil-
ity for asylum under section 208(a), Cardoza-Fonseca argued that
the BIA erred in applying the "clear probability" standard rather
than the "well-founded fear" standard. The Court of Appeals
agreed, holding that an alien seeking asylum is required to demon-
strate a "well-founded fear" of persecution, a standard not
equivalent to the "clear probability" of persecution standard appli-
cable to withholding of deportation claims.
7 8
The court reasoned that the plain language of sections 208(a)
and 243(h), and the overall structure of the INA supported the
conclusion that the two standards differed.7 9 The court explained:
We note that a recognition of the difference between the stan-
dards comports with the structure of the Immigration Act...
there is a valid reason for applying a stricter standard where an
alien claims he or she is entitled to a mandatory prohibition
against deportation than where that person is asking only that
he or she be found eligible for consideration for a grant of asy-
77. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1450 (9th Cir. 1984). The Court of Appeals
consolidated the Cardoza-Fonseca case with an appeal from the BIA's denial of relief to
Francisca Rosa Arguello-Salguera. Id. at 1448. Arguello-Salguera was also a native and citi-
zen of Nicaragua, who entered the United States illegally, without inspection, on March 15,
1980. Id. at 1450. Deportation proceedings were instituted against her, spanning two and
one-half years and three deportation hearings. Like Cardoza-Fonseca, she too conceded de-
portability and applied for asylum and withholding of deportation. Id. At the final hearing
the immigration judge concluded that Arguello-Salguera demonstrated both a clear
probability and well-founded fear of persecution, and issued a prohibition against deporta-
tion and granted her asylum. Id.
INS appealed the decision to the BIA, which reversed, vacating the decision and order-
ing Arguello-Salguera deported. Id. The BIA equated the standards under the claims for
asylum and withholding of deportation and concluded that she had failed to demonstrate
"she would be singled [sic] out for persecution" if forced to return to Nicaragua. Id. at 1450,
1454. Arguello-Salguera appealed the denial of both claims to the Court of Appeals. Id. at
1450. She also appealed the summary denial of her motion to dismiss the INS appeal of the
immigration judge's decision, and the BIA's denial of her request for voluntary departure.
Id. at 1450-51 n.2. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss and did not con-
sider the request for voluntary departure because of its decision reversing the asylum and
withholding of deportation claims. Id.
The Ninth Circuit's remand instructed the BIA to consider the asylum claim under the
"proper legal standard." Id. at 1455. In addition, the claim for prohibition against deporta-
tion was remanded for clarification because the court was unable to determine from the
opinion the findings and reasons for denying relief. Id. In particular, the court stated that it
could not conclude whether the BIA's decision was based on the credibility of Arguello-
Salguera or the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Id.
78. Id. at 1451.
79. Id. at 1451-52.
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lum, a grant that ultimately will be made or denied by the At-
torney General in the exercise of his discretion."'
Further discussion of the differences between the meanings of
the "clear probability" and "well-founded fear" standards led the
court to reaffirm its reasoning, implicitly endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Stevic.8 1 The court reiterated that the inquiry under the
"clear probability" standard should be "whether it is more likely
than not that the alien would be subject to persecution. '82 By con-
trast, under the well-founded fear analysis the question becomes
whether the alien has a "subjective fear," and whether that fear
has "enough of a basis that it can be considered well-founded." 3
The court concluded:
The term "well-founded fear" refers to a subjective state of
mind, while "clear probability" refers to an objective fact. The
latter phrase requires an examination of the objective realities,
while the former requires an analysis of the applicant's mental
state (notwithstanding the fact that the fear must have some ob-
jective basis if we are ultimately to find it well-founded)."4
Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the BIA had erroneously
applied the "clear probability" standard rather than the "well-
founded fear" standard when it determined that Cardoza-Fonseca
failed to establish eligibility for asylum under section 208(a). 5 Ac-
cordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded." The
INS, however, filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the Court of Appeals with the United States Supreme
Court."'
D. United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court granted certiorari8 8 to resolve the conflict
in the circuits.88 The issue before the Court as the Solicitor Gen-
80. Id. (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 1451 (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984)).
82. Id. at 1452 (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984)).
83. Id. at 1452-53.
84. Id. at 1452.
85. Id. at 1453.
86. Id. at 1455.
87. See INS Proceeding, supra note 1. The INS did not seek review of the decision with
respect to Arguello-Salguera. Id. at 5 n.1.
88. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 475 U.S. 1009 (1986).
89. The conflict existed between the Third Circuit, which adopted the BIA's position in
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eral framed it was purely one of law unencumbered by facts:
"Whether an alien's burden of proving eligibility for asylum pursu-
ant to Section 208(a) is equivalent to his burden of proving eligibil-
ity for withholding deportation pursuant to Section 243(h). .. .
The opinion of the Court,9 ' authored by Justice Stevens, who
also authored the Court's unanimous decision in Stevic, drew a
concurrence by Justice Blackman,"2 a concurrence in judgment by
Justice Scalia,"s and a strong dissent by Justice Powell, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White joined.94 The Court
agreed with the Ninth Circuit and held that the standards under
sections 208(a) and 243(h) were not equivalent.' 5 The Court ex-
pressly made its holding narrow, stating that "we merely hold that
the Immigration Judge and the BIA were incorrect in holding that
the two standards are identical."" Moreover, the Court disclaimed
any "attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the well-
founded fear test should be applied,"' leaving that task to the
"process of case-by-case adjudication.' 8
The majority opinion had three principal parts: the Court's in-
terpretation of congressional intent as expressed in the plain
meaning of the statutory language and the legislative history; the
Court's response to the government's arguments; and finally, the
majority's response to the dissent.
Justice Stevens began the opinion with a brief discussion of
the obverse issue, decided by the Court two years earlier in the
case of INS v. Stevic.9 In Stevic, the Court held that the standard
of proof under section 243(h) is a "clear probability" of persecu-
tion, which requires a showing that "it is more likely than not that
the alien would be subject to persecution." 100 Although the Stevic
Sotto v. INS, 748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1984) and the Sixth, Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360
(6th Cir. 1984), Seventh, Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984), and Ninth,
Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984), Circuits.
90. INS Proceeding, supra note 1.
91. The majority was comprised of Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Blackman, and
O'Connor. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS 107 S. Ct 1207, 1208 (1987).
92. Id. at 1222-23.
93. Id. at 1223-25.
94. Id. at 1225-32.
95. Id. at 1211.
96. Id. at 1222.
97. Id. (footnote omitted).
98. Id. at 1221.
99. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
100. Id. at 424. For further discussion of Stevic, see Helton, INS v. Stevic: Standards
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Court declined to interpret the "well-founded fear" standard, it
did expressly assume for purposes of the case before it that the
"well-founded fear" standard was "more generous" than the "clear
probability" standard. 1' With Stevic as a backdrop, the Court
turned to the task at hand, the meaning and scope of the "well-
founded fear" standard.
1 0 2
The Court began its formal discussion with an analysis of the
critical language of the standards of proof pursuant to sections
208(a) and 243(h) of the INA.' Section 243(h) provides that the
Attorney General shall grant withholding of an alien's deportation
to any country where "such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened."104 Section 208(a) provides that the Attorney General
has discretion to grant asylum if he "determines that such alien is
a refugee." 105 The Refugee Act provides in pertinent part that the
term "refugee" means any person who has "a well-founded fear of
persecution."'0 6
In its analysis, the Court employed basic principles of statu-
tory construction to glean Congressional intent from the language
of the Refugee Act. The Court reasoned that the "ordinary and
obvious meaning of [a] phrase is not to be lightly discounted,' 1 7
especially with regard to the immigration statutes, with respect to
which the Court expressly considered itself "bound to assume 'that
the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words used.' "108
Initially, the Court concluded that the language difference be-
tween the terms "well-founded fear" and "would be threatened"
plainly demonstrated that Congress intended the standards for
of Proof in Refugee Cases Involving Political Asylum and Withholding of Deportation, 87
W. VA. L. REv. 787 (1985); Note, Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Under the Refu-
gee Act of 1980: INS v. Stevic, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 367 (1985); Recent Development, Immigra-
tion Law: Political Asylum for Deportable Aliens - Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice v. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. 2489 (1984), 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 225 (1985).
101. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 424.
102. Note that by discussing Stevic before reaching the merits of the issue in this case
Justice Stevens points to Supreme Court dicta which supports the conclusion that the stan-
dards are not equal.
103. 107 S. Ct. at 1212-13.
104. INA § 243 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
106. INA § 101(a)(42)(A) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982)).
107. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1213.
108. Id. (citations omitted).
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asylum and withholding of deportation to be different.'0 " The
Court bolstered its conclusion with the fact that Congress in the
Refugee Act of 1980, while "simultaneously" adding section 208(a)
and amending section 243(h), incorporated a new standard in sec-
tion 208(a) but left the old standard in section 243(h).10 In aid of
this interpretation of the legislative intent, the Court invoked the
principle of statutory construction that "where Congress includes
particular language in one section of the same Act, it generally is
presumed that Congress acted intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.""' Thus, the Court concluded
that in light of the linguistic differences in the statutes and Con-
gress' deliberate selection of different language in section 208(a)




Secondly, but more importantly, the Court found that the
meaning conveyed by the language of each section establishes that
the standards are not equivalent.' The Court found that the
"well-founded fear" standard has a subjective component not pre-
sent in the "would be threatened" standard which has only an ob-
jective component.1 4 Specifically, the Court found that the refer-
ence to "fear" in the asylum standard focuses on the alien's
subjective state of mind." 5 In contrast, the withholding of deporta-
tion standard has no equivalent "subjective component," but
rather "requires the alien to establish by objective evidence that it
is more likely than not that he or she will be subject to persecution
upon deportation. '" 6 The Court also found that the "well-
founded" element of the standard "does not alter the obvious focus
on the individual's subjective belief, nor does it transform the stan-
dard into a 'more likely than not' one.""' 7 Implicit in this finding
109. Id. The Government appeared to concede that, as a matter of linguistics, sections
208(a) and 243(h) are not identical.
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)
cited in Russell v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1212-13. The Court's finding that the standards are not equivalent is impor-
tant in light of the Government's argument that even if the standards are different, Con-
gress intended for the well-founded fear standard to be interpreted as equivalent to the
clear probability standard. Petitioner's Brief at 22-28, Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS 107 S.Ct
1207 (1987) (No. 85-782).
114. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct at 1212-13.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1212 (footnote omitted) (citing Stevic, 467 U.S. at 422).
117. Id. at 1213. The Court illustrated that the "well-founded" element of the require-
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was the Court's recognition that the "well-founded fear" standard
has an objective component. However, the Court appeared to rea-
son that the subjective component of the standard prevents the
"well-founded fear" standard from demanding the mathematical
certainty specifically required by the "clear probability" standard.
The Court viewed the differences in emphasis and meaning as fur-
ther supporting its conclusion that the standards are not
equivalent.
The dissent, however, did not agree that the language of sec-
tion 208(a) is as clear and unambiguous as the majority pro-
posed.11 The dissent reasoned that, inasmuch as the words "well-
founded" "contemplate some objective basis without specifying a
particular evidentiary threshold," the statute is patently ambigu-
ous.119 Moreover, since both the "well-founded fear" and "clear
probability" standards require "some objective basis," it is unclear
from the face of the statute whether Congress intended to distin-
guish the standards on this component. 2 '
Justice Powell writing for the dissent, agreed with the major-
ity that the language of section 208(a) differs from the language of
section 243(h) because the reference to "fear" contemplates a sub-
jective inquiry. However, he was not convinced that the partially
objective inquiry mandated by the words "well-founded" "differs
in practice" from the objective inquiry required by the "clear
probability" standard.'21 In fact, he specifically objected to the ma-
jority's conclusion that "the objective inquiries under the two sec-
tions necessarily are different," arguing that the Court, in reaching
this conclusion, gave "short shrift to the words 'well-founded,' that
clearly require some objective basis for the alien's fear."' 2
The dissent concluded that the plain meaning of the statute
did not resolve what it deemed to be the "critical question" of the
case, whether the objective inquiries of the two standards "differ in
ment of section 208(a) does not necessarily rise to the level of a clear probability, i.e., more
likely than not, as required by Stevie for section 243(h).
118. Id. at 1227.
119. Id. at 1228.
120. Id. at 1227.
121. Id. Thus, the dissent suggested that the "critical question" was "whether the ob-
jective basis required for a fear of persecution to be 'well-founded' differs in practice from
the objective basis required for there to be a 'clear probability' of persecution." (emphasis in
original).
122. Id. at 1227.
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practice.12 3 This question, the dissent suggested, is "best an-
swered" by the BIA, the entity "familiar with the types of evidence
and issues that arise in such cases,""4 and the one "to whom Con-
gress has committed the question." 125 Accordingly, the dissent en-
dorsed the BIA's decision in Acosta,"2 6 answering the "critical
question" in the negative,' as one entitled to substantial defer-
ence 2 8 and as a reasonable interpretation of the Refugee Act.2 9
Justice Stevens subsequently turned his attention to the legis-
lative histories of section 208(a) and the Refugee Act. He explained
that an examination of the legislative history was required, even
though he previously had concluded that the "plain language of
this statute appears to settle the question before us." 3 0 The exam-
ination, however, is limited to a determination of "whether there is
'clearly expressed legislative intention' contrary" to the plain lan-
guage of the statute, "which would require [the Court] to question
the strong presumption that chooses."' 13' The Court considered
three aspects of the legislative history that it found particularly
compelling: (1) pre-1980 practice under section 203(a)(7) of the
INA, which provided "conditional entry" for aliens outside the
United States; (2) the impact of the United Nations Protocol Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees on United States asylum law after
the United States acceded in 1968; and (3) the Conference Com-
mittee Report regarding the adoption of the House bill over the
Senate bill."'
Section 203(a)(7) of the INA of 1952, authorized the Attorney
General to grant "conditional entry" to a limited number of aliens
fleeing from Communist countries, Communist-dominated coun-
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1227-28.
125. Id. at 1228. Congress originally authorized the Attorney General to determine eli-
gibility for asylum pursuant to section 208(a), the Attorney General in turn delegated the
responsibility to the BIA.
126. No. 2986 (BIA Mar. 1 1985).
127. The BIA concluded that "the standards for asylum and withholding of deportation
are not meaningfully different and, in practicality, converge." Id. at 25.
128. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1228 (1987) ("This is just the type of
expert judgment - formed by the entity to whom Congress has committed the question -
to which we should defer."
129. Id. at 1228. The dissent commented, "Based on the text of the Act alone, I can not
conclude that this conclusion is unreasonable."
130. Id. at 1213 n.12.
131. Id. (citing United States v. James, 106 S. Ct. 3116 (1986), and quoting Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
132. Id. at 1214.
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tries or the Middle East "because of persecution or fear of persecu-
tion." ' s The Court found that the conditional entry standard ap-
plied pursuant to section 203(a)(7) "was unquestionably more
lenient than the 'clear probability' standard applied in section
243(h) proceedings."1 4 However, the conditional entry standard
lacked the "well-founded" requirement present in section 208(a).
The Court acknowledged this apparent flaw in its analysis, but ar-
gued that Congress added the "well-founded" language in order to
bring the statute into conformity with the United Nations Protocol
on Refugees.18 Thus, the Court concluded that the practice under
section 203(a)(7) demonstrated Congressional intent to preserve
existing standards for granting asylum, i.e., that the "standard for
admission under section 207 be no different than the one previ-
ously applied under section 203(a)(7).
'1 36
In 1968, the United States acceded to the United Nations Pro-
tocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 117 By acceding to the Pro-
tocol, the United States was bound to comply with the substantive
provisions of Articles 2 through 34 of the United Nations Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees138 regarding "refugees" as
defined by Article 1.2 of the Protocol.3 " Congress adopted the Pro-
tocol's definition of "refugee" in the Refugee Act in order to "bring
133. INA § 203(a)(7) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976)), Pub. L. No.
89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 913, repealed by 94 Stat. 107. Section 203(a)(7) provided authority to
grant "conditional entry" to aliens:
(A) that (i) because of persecution . . . on account of race, religion, or political
opinion they have fled (I) from any Communist or Communist-dominated coun-
try or area, or (II) from any country within the general area of the Middle East,
and (ii) are unable or unwilling to return to such country or area on account of
race, religion, or political opinion, and (iii) are not nationals of the countries or
areas in which their application for conditional entry is made ....
Numerical ceilings were placed on admissions. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.9. (1983), revised 48 Fed.
Reg. 8 (which limited the countries in which conditional entry visas could be processed to
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, and Lebanon).
134. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1214 (1897). The Court, in support of
this conclusion, cites Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 569-70 (1967) and Adamska, 12 I. & N. Dec.
201, 202 (1967).
135. Id. at 1214-15, n.16.
136. Id. at 1215, n.18.
137. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, TIAS No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. Regarding the
United States' accession in 1968 see H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 781 96 Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADMIN. NEWS 160.
138. July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. Note that the United States is not a signatory to
the Convention. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 416 n.9. Article of the Protocol states:
"... Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the
Convention ... .
139. The Protocol incorporates by reference the Convention's definition of refugee.
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United States refugee law into conformance" with the United
States international obligations under the Protocol.'40 The Court
interpreted the legislative history as not only demonstrating that
"Congress adopted the Protocol's standard in the statute, but...
Congress' intent that the new statutory definition of 'refugee' be
interpreted in conformance with the Protocol's definition."''
Thus, the Court concluded that it is "appropriate" to interpret the
meaning of "well-founded fear" "with relation to the Protocol."' 42
Accordingly, the Court reviewed various interpretive materials
on the United Nations Protocol. 4 s The most important of these
was the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status. 44 The Court, after extensive review of the Hand-
book and other sources interpreting the Protocol, concludes that
the "well-founded fear" standard is clearly different from the
"clear probability" standard of section 243(h). 1"
The dissent found the interpretive materials "only marginally
relevant.' ' 46 The dissent's principal objection was that the Hand-
book has "no binding force, because 'the determination of refugee
status under the . . . Protocol . . . is incumbent upon the Con-
tracting State.' ",147
The Court also referred to the changes made by the Confer-
ence Committee on the House and Senate bills as evidence of Con-
gressional intent to differentiate the standards. The Court focused
on the Committee's use of language in the House bill' " as opposed
to language in the Senate bill. 49 Both bills authorized the Attor-
ney General, in his discretion, to grant asylum if the applicant is a
"refugee" within the meaning of the Refugee Act. The Senate bill,
however, differed from the House bill by imposing the additional
requirement that asylum would be denied unless the alien's "de-
portation or return would be prohibited under section 243(h)."'
50
140. 107 S. Ct. at 1216.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1216-18.
144. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (Geneva
1979) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
145. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1217-18 (1987).
146. Id. at 1229.
147. Id. at 1230 (quoting HANDBOOK, at 1).
148. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980).
149. S. 643, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980).
150. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1218. The Senate bill provided:
The Attorney General shall establish a uniform procedure for an alien physically
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The Court concluded that the language in the Senate bill
demonstrated that "the Senate recognized that there is a differ-
ence between the 'well-founded fear' standard and the 'clear
probability' standard." '' In addition, the Court interpreted Con-
gress' refusal to enact the Senate bill as clear evidence that Con-
gress did not intend for asylum to be governed by the "clear
probability" standard."5 ' The dissent, however, sees "no reason to
believe" that the enactment of the House bill, rather than the Sen-
ate bill, was persuasive evidence that Congress intended to pre-
serve two different standards to govern applications for asylum
and withholding of deportation. 5 ' Rather, the dissent accorded
"no weight" to the Committee's selection of the language in the
House bill, and argued that both bills actually were "intended to
preserve the Attorney General's regulations treating the two stan-
dards as substantially identical."' 54
Note that the Court also considered the question of whether
the BIA's contruction of sections 208(a) and 243(h) should be ac-
corded substantial deference. It concluded that the "question of
whether Congress intended the two standards to be identical is a
pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide,"
and therefore the BIA's interpretation of the equality of the stan-
dards is not entitled to any deference."5'
In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court narrowly held that "[T]he Im-
migration Judge and the BIA were incorrect in holding that the
[standard for withholding deportation and granting asylum] are
identical."' 56 In brief, the Court's decision rested on its finding
that Congress deliberately used different language to establish di-
verse standards to govern eligibility for relief under sections 208(a)
and 243(h). This was an attempt to comport with the United
States international obligations under the U.N. Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees. The Court also sought to legitimize its
present in the United States, irrespective of his status, to apply for asylum, and
the alien shall be granted asylum if he is a refugee within the meaning of section
101(a)(42)(A) and his deportation or return be prohibited under section 243(h)
of this Act.
S. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1979).
151. Cardoza -Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1218.
152. Id. at 1219.
153. Id. at 1230.
154. Id. at 1230 n.6.
155. Id. at 1220-22. Contra Justice Scalia's concurrence at 1224-25, and Justice Powell's
dissent at 1227-28.
156. Id. at 1222.
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findings that the legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980 evi-
denced clear Congressional intent not to make aliens eligible for
asylum under section 208(a) equally eligible for withholding of de-
portation under section 243(h)."5' Justice Blackmun, in concurring
with the Court's opinion and judgment, commented that in his
view the Court "directed the INS to the appropriate sources from
which the agency should derive the meaning of the 'well-founded
fear' standard."'158 It is from those sources and from the Court's
opinion that this comment attempts to propose a meaningful evi-
dentiary standard by which to govern applications for asylum filed
pursuant to section 208(a).
IV. REACHING THE EVIDENTIARY BORDER: BURDENS OF PROOF,
PERSUASION AND STATUTORY ELIGIBILITY
It should be noted at the outset that in an evaluation of com-
bined section 208(a) and section 243(h) claims, the determination
of a "well-founded fear" may not necessarily need to be made. A
withholding of deportation claim under Section 243(h) triggers the
more stringent clear probability standard.15 If an alien demon-
strates a clear probability of persecution, then a well-founded fear
"will, a fortiori, also have been met."' e0
The Court in Cardoza-Fonseca unequivocally stated that it
provided no guidance to the application of the well-founded fear
standard.16' Consequently, the political asylum test must develop
157. Id. at 1212-13.
158. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S.Ct. at 1223 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia does not share in Justice Blackmun's sentiments regarding the Court's exami-
nation of sources from which the meaning of the "well-founded fear" standard can be de-
rived. Justice Scalia, in contrast, "fears" that the Court's extensive and "gratuitous" exami-
nation of the legislative history would be "interpreted as a betrayal of [the Court's]
assurance that it does 'not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the well-
founded fear test should be applied.'" Id. at 1223-25 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting 107 S. Ct at 1222).
159. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984).
160. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1984). It is possible, how-
ever, that political asylum would still be denied since it is a discretionary form of relief. The
alien merely has met his lesser burden of proof under a well-founded fear standard by es-
tablishing the greater burden of a clear probability of persecution under a withholding of
deportation claim. It is then the decision, and discretion, of the immigration judge whether
he will grant asylum. If asylum is denied, the alien may be deported to another country
because relief under a withholding of deportation claim is only country-specific. See supra
note 29.
161. "We do not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the well-founded
fear test should be applied." Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct at 1222.
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through the process of case-by-case adjudication." 2 Thus, an at-
tempt to give some meaning to the standard under Cardoza-Fon-
seca appears to be a valueless effort. Nonetheless, the language in
Cardoza-Fonseca actually provides significant guidance in formu-
lating the analysis of an asylum claim.
1 63
The Court's decision compares and emphasizes the inherent
differences under sections 208(a) and 243(h) of the Act that run
counter to the imposition of a more stringent standard than in-
tended by Congress with asylum claims.164 The limited scope of the
opinion, however, does not affect the viability of the framework
developed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in its deci-
sion, In re Acosta.'6" Although the Acosta decision recognized the
differences between the standards, the BIA concluded that in prac-
tice they converged.166 The BIA erred only to the extent that it
required a "more likely than not" showing by the alien. Its frame-
work remains functional under the appropriate standard enunci-
ated in Cardoza-Fonseca.
To demonstrate eligibility for political asylum or withholding
of deportation, the BIA has constructed a two-tier framework.
First, the alien must meet his or her burden of proof and persua-
sion.1 7 Second, the alien must demonstrate that he falls within the
162. Id.
163. Although the Court denied any attempt to set forth a standard for applying the
well-founded fear test in political asylum claims, it rendered a caveat in the wake of several
pages discussing the various sources that give meaning to this standard. Cardoza-Fonseca,
107 S. Ct at 1213-20. Only then did the Court realize that the narrow legal question before it
- whether the standards under §208(a) and §243(h) are the same - does not involve the
interpretation of the standards. Id. at 1221. The Court's exhaustive effort to ascertain the
legislative history of the Act easily becomes a backhand attempt to provide an interpreta-
tion of the well-founded fear standard. Id. at 1224 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, Justice
Blackmun, in a separate concurrenc6, felt compelled to emphasize that the Court "eschews
any attempt to give substance to the term . . . and leaves that task to the 'process of case-
by-case adjudication'...." Id. at 1223. Yet, even he conceded that the Court's guidance
"should be significant in the [INS] formulation of the 'well-founded fear' standard." Id.
(emphasis supplied).
164. See infra text accompanying notes 198-204.
165. 19 I. & N. Dec. No. 2986 (BIA March 1, 1985).
166. For the most part, the courts have applied the "well-founded" portion of the test
in a manner not consistent with true objective analysis. The absence of an analytical frame-
work, coupled with the necessity of case-by-case adjudication, is comparable to a journey
into previously unchartered territory. Objectivity in the decisional process is replaced with a
balancing approach. The Acosta opinion, however, provides a methodology for arriving at a
reliable conclusion without as much extraneous influence by such factors as political pres-
sures, subjectivity, and intuition.
167. Acosta, No. 2986 at 6.
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statutory standards of Section 208(a) and Section 243(h).' 6 8
A. Burden of Persuasion: The Prima Facie Case
An alien, like any other claimant, bears the burden of proof
for his claim. 69 This burden necessarily encompasses the burden
of persuasion and the burden of production. 17 0 In the field of immi-
gration law, the burden of persuasion requires the alien to convince
the trier of fact of the truth' 7 ' of his allegations by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 7 The burden of production simply refers to
the burden of going forward with the evidence; in both asylum and
withholding of deportation cases, this burden has been statutorily
allocated to the alien.17 1 Once the alien's prima facie case has been
made, only statutory eligibility remains to be established.
In determining whether the alien has met his burden of per-
suasion, the immigration judge, as trier of fact, must assess the
probative force of the evidence and the credibility of the wit-
nesses.17" In this respect, the evidence proffered by the alien can be
persuasive and credible if it provides specific detail of the circum-
stances surrounding the alien's allegations. It also should be logi-
cally consistent with all other evidence presented, whether it is tes-
timonial or physical in nature. 75 Ideally, this evidence should not
be entirely subjective; that is, the evidence should not be from the
alien's testimony alone. The immigration judge should be
presented with some type of objective evidence to corroborate the
alien's subjective proof.176 Therefore, under the best of circum-
168. Id.
169. Id. at 7. In immigration proceedings, there is an exception to this rule. The govern-
ment, in a deportation case, must "establish the facts supporting deportability by clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence." Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966); accord, INS v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 n.19 (1984).
170. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.5 (3d ed. 1985).
171. The alien must demonstrate that his statements are credible. Del Valle v. INS.,
776 F.2d 1407, 1412 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985). Moreover, vague testimony may adversely impact
upon a credibility determination. See Estrada v. INS., 775 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 1985).
Thus, specificity or clarity becomes extremely critical in the determination of eligibility. See
infra note 175 and accompanying text.
172. Acosta, No. 2986 at 7. The "truth" being of course, a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion under a § 208(a) claim, and a clear probability of persecution under § 243(h).
173. 8 C.F.R. § 208.5 (1985); 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1985).
174. See, e.g., U.S. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION, PATTERN JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS (Criminal Cases), Nos. 4, 5 (1985).
175. Acosta, No. 2986 at 10.
176. Id.
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stances, a prima facie showing requires evidence that is (1) specific,
(2) logically consistent, (3) objective, and (4) corroborative. 7
It is unlikely, however, that the typical asylum claim will arise
under the best of circumstances for the alien. More often than not,
an alien has been unable to gather documentary evidence.' Proof
by documentary evidence will be the exception and not the rule." 9
Other than his own testimony, usually there will be no other evi-
dence available which the alien can offer to the immigration judge.
For this reason, statements in the asylum application become criti-
cal and the alien's testimony cannot be rejected merely because it
is self-serving. To disregard it, the immigration judge must make a
specific finding that the alien lacks credibility.' Otherwise, the
testimony should be deemed "worthy of belief," and the truth of
his version of the facts accepted.
1 8
1
However,- an immigration judge has two primary grounds for
discrediting an alien's testimony in an asylum hearing: inconsistent
statements and witness demeanor.' First, with regard to inconsis-
tent statements, no clear-cut test can be found in the Refugee Act
or the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees; 18 3 a judge gener-
177. These four requirements can be traced to the HANDBOOK, supra note 144. To es-
tablish the facts of a claim, the HANDBOOK notes: "Allowance for such possible lack of evi-
dence does not, however, mean that unsupported statements must necessarily be accepted
as true if they are inconsistent with the general account not forwarded by the applicant."
HANDBOOK, supra note 144, at 47. Thus, logical consistency is established by negative impli-
cation. The HANDBOOK continues:
(a) The applicant should:
(i Tell the truth and assist the examiner to the full in establishing the facts of
his case.
(ii) Make an effort to support his statements by any available evidence. . . [ele-
ment of corroboration]
(iii) Supply all pertinent information [implies element of objectivity] concerning
himself and his past experience in as much detail [element of specificity] as is
necessary to enable the examiner to establish the relevant facts ...
HANDBOOK, supra note 144, at 47, 49 (bracket material indicates authors' comments).
178. Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984); Dawood-Haio v. INS, 800
F.2d 90, 96 (6th Cir. 1986) ("we ought not to jump to the assumption that what [govern-
ments] have not documented they have not done.").
179. HANDBOOK, supra note 144, at 47.
180. Sihasale, 11 I. & N. Dec. 759, 762 (BIA 1966); Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 319 (BIA
1973).
181. Acosta, No. 2986 at 10. In the absence of an adverse credibility finding, on appeal,
the alien's testimony is presumed credible. Platero-Cortez v. INS, 804 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th
Cir. 1986).
182. Platero-Cortez, 804 F.2d at 1130; Martinez-Sanchez v. INS, 794 F.2d 1396, 1400
(9th Cir. 1986).
183. Nor can a test for inconsistency be found expressly in the Federal Rules of Evi-
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ally possesses a wide range of discretion in this area. Despite the
judge's discretion and the absence of a standard, the inconsisten-
cies should be minimally governed by the standard of materiality.
If the inconsistencies are unrelated to or have little bearing on the
merits of the case, then such triviality should not cause the entire
testimony to be disregarded.' 8" In the second phase of analysis, it
would be the rare case when an alien is found not credible solely
on the basis of her demeanor. Such a finding, to be affirmed on
appeal, would require the development of an extensive record by
the immigration judge.
18 6
In the absence of an adverse credibility determination, the
alien's testimony is accepted as true. But, the probative sufficiency
of the testimony does not excuse the alien from establishing "spe-
cific, objective facts that support an inference of past persecution
or risk of future persecution. That the objective facts are estab-
lished through credible and persuasive testimony of the applicant
does not make those facts less objective."' 186 When this evidence is
accepted by the immigration judge, and it establishes prima facie
grounds for substantive relief, the alien has satisfied the first-tier
requirement of proof. He must then demonstrate statutory eligibil-
ity for asylum.
B. Burden of Production: Eligibility for Asylum
Eligibility for asylum requires an alien to prove that he is a
"refugee," as that term is defined in the Act. To qualify for "refu-
gee" status:
(1) the alien must show a "fear" of "persecution;"
(2) that fear must be "well-founded;"
(3) the persecution must be "on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion;" and
(4) the alien is unable or unwilling to return to his country of
nationality or to the country in which he last habitually resided
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. 8 '
dence. See D. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 75, § 34 (West 3d ed. 1984).
184. Platero-Cortez, 804 F.2d at 1131; Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th
Cir. 1986).
185. Martinez-Sanchez, 794 F.2d at 1400.
186. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984).
187. Sanchez and Escobar, I. & N. Dec. No. 2996 (BIA Oct. 15, 1985). See also Acosta,
I. & N. Dec. No. 2986 (BIA Mar. 1, 1985).
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The phrase "persecution or well-founded fear of persecution"
dominates eligibility under the Act. By combining elements that
are both subjective and objective in nature, this standard equally
protects the interest of the alien and the humanitarian interests
served by the statute.
The subjective element, fear, involves a state of mind. It en-
compasses the "consciousness of approaching danger; [a] mental
response to threat."' 8 By its very nature, this element will take
into account any possible threat of persecution, as perceived by
the alien. At this point, because only bare assertions are evaluated,
only an adverse credibility determination could overcome the
alien's statement as to his fear.
The term "fear" is preceded by the words "well-founded."
This qualification dictates that the subjective element of fear must
be grounded in objective fact. Given the likelihood that every alien
can demonstrate some sort of fear,'89 the focus is on the circum-
stances that trigger this fear. The requirement of objectivity
thereby serves to preclude those claims which are a matter of per-
sonal conjecture, even when the objective facts are only available
from the testimony of the alien. 90
In analyzing a claim under the "well-founded fear" standard,
the first hurdle to overcome concerns the order of analysis. Should
the immigration judge evaluate the objective or the subjective evi-
dence first? Is there even a consequential difference? Those courts
considering the question of order have taken different approaches
without setting forth the reasons for the particular method chosen.
In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the standard to
require an objective-subjective order. In discussing the amount of
evidence necessary to establish that a fear is well-founded, the
court noted that it was "only after objective evidence sufficient to
suggest a risk of persecution has been introduced that the alien's
subjective fears and desire to avoid the risk-laden situation in his
or her native land become relevant."'"
188. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 549 (5th ed. 1979).
189. It seems that in practice the fear possessed by an alien is never challenged. The
authors found no case where the immigration judge determined that the alien did not pos-
sess the requisite fear. In fact, this element of proof is virtually presumed, as few cases even
bother to discuss it. The HANDBOOK, supra note 144, suggests that an alien's fear can be
presumed. See infra text accompanying notes 192-95.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 176-79.
191. 767 F.2d at 1453.
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Conversely, in In re Acosta, the BIA began its analysis with
the alien's subjective fear of persecution.'9 2 It then considered
whether that fear had a solid basis in objective facts. 1 93 Although
no express reason was stated for this approach, the opinion ex-
amined the use of the word "fear" in the Refugee Act of 1980 and
in the Handbook. The BIA reasoned that the prominence of the
word in both the Act and the Handbook required the alien to
demonstrate first that his or her primary motive for requesting ref-
uge was fear. 9 4 The BIA's conclusion suggests it presumed this
primary motive requirement necessarily obligated it to begin the
analysis with the subjective component of the standard. Perhaps
the BIA was further influenced by the Handbook's methodology
which also treats the interpretation of "well-founded fear" in this
order.'95 The Handbook does not, however, mandate this particular
order of analysis; nor does it express any reason for selecting it.
Irrespective of how this interpretive problem is resolved, the selec-
tion of one method over the other will not affect the outcome of an
alien's claim for asylum. As noted, an alien's fear is generally not
questioned. "It may be assumed that unless he seeks adventure or
just wishes to see the world, a person would not normally abandon
his home and county without some compelling reason."'"9 Thus,
the element of fear, for all practical purposes, is not a critical com-
ponent to the alien's case. A court's discussion of an alien's fear,
whether before or after an examination of the objective facts, is no
more than formalism.
197
Before discussing the four requirements under the statute, it is
worth emphasizing that an alien may prove the existence of the
requirements by testimonial or corroborative objective evidence.
However, when the alien provides credible testimony regarding
persecution there is no absolute requirement that the alien provide
corroboration. 198
192. Acosta, I. & N. Dec. No. 2986 (BIA Mar. 1, 1985) at 12.
193. Id. at 21.
194. Id. at 15. HANDBOOK, supra note 144, at 11 (defining refugees by the concept of
"fear" as a relevant motive).
195. HANDBOOK, supra note 144, at 11-12.
196. Id. at 12.
197. The authors have placed the discussion of the "fear" element following that of the
well-foundedness requirement for two reasons. First, and most obviously, this approach cor-
responds to the order of the terms in the Act and the Convention. Second, at least one
circuit, the Ninth, has suggested this approach. See supra text accompanying note 189.




1. The Objective Facts: Establishing Well-Foundedness
The term "well-founded" qualifies the subjective state of fear.
It implies that the fear "must be supported by an objective situa-
tion."'199 Instead of thoughts or feelings, it is the reality outside the
alien's mind that is the focus. Whether the evidence is testimonial
or corroborative in nature, the facts must enable the court to con-
clude that the alien is likely to become a victim of persecution.
It is at this point that all similarity in method of proof disap-
pears between a withholding of deportation and a political asylum
application. In Stevic, Justice Stevens declared that, under a Sec-
tion 243(h) withholding of deportation claim, an alien must
demonstrate a clear probability of persecution.2 0 This standard
"requires that an application be supported by evidence establish-
ing that it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject
to persecution. '" 10' Almost three years later, in Cardoza-Fonseca,
Justice Stevens found that a section 208(a) asylum application was
governed by a standard of proof less stringent than clear
probability.20 2 Although, the well-founded fear test was declared
more generous than the clear probability standard, the Court re-
frained from "set[ting] forth a detailed description of how [it]
should be applied."20 8
Justice Stevens reasoned that the statutory language in the
Act evidenced the Senate's cognizance of the difference between
the two standards. The use of different language with the new po-
litical asylum standard "certainly indicate[d] that Congress in-
tended the two standards to differ. ' 's2" Further, it follows that the
standards should differ for another reason. Establishing a clear
probability of persecution creates an entitlement to mandatory
suspension of deportation.20 ' An alien who proves a well-founded
fear of persecution has only demonstrated eligibility for a discre-
tionary grant of asylum.
2 6
Although asylum is a less favorable remedy because the alien's
199. HANDBOOK, supra note 144, at 12.
200. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 407.
201. Id.
202. 107 S. Ct at 1213.
203. Id. at 1222.
204. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1213. See supra test accompanying notes 147-52.
205. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1219. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20,
28-29.
206. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1219.
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fate rests with the discretion of the Attorney General, an alien is
benefitted with a lower standard of proof. The advantage of this
lower threshold is that it can be hurdled although the evidence in-
dicates a less than fifty percent chance of persecution."' The
Court provided an example of this situation:
Let us ... presume that it is known that in the applicant's
country of origin every tenth adult male person is either put to
death or sent to some remote labor camp... In such a case it
would be only too apparent that anyone who has managed to
escape from the country in question will have a "well-founded
fear of persecution" upon his eventual return. 08
In Carcamo-Flores v. INS,210 the Second Circuit provided fur-
ther examples of the type of objective evidence necessary to sup-
port an alien's fear of persecution. It considered affidavits, journal-
istic accounts of other persecution, and testimony sufficient to
corroborate an alien's claim. 10 The court further recognized that
an alien's testimony alone could suffice, especially where it is diffi-
cult or impossible to obtain documentary evidence.2 1' The court
concluded that the proper test to apply had been articulated by
the Fifth Circuit.
In Guevara-Flores v. INS, the Fifth Circuit found a "mere ir-
rational apprehension [to be] insufficient to meet the alien's bur-
den of proof."212 The court formulated the test as follows:
An alien possesses a well-founded fear of persecution if a reason-
able person in her circumstances would fear persecution if she
were to be returned to her native country.
213
In the search for objective facts supporting an alien's claim, it
follows that objectivity should be evaluated in light of a reasonable
person standard.2 14 A court, in its analysis of the well-foundedness
207. Id. at 1213. See also Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1986).
208. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1213 (citation omitted). Because of the subjective
nature of fear, the facts that establish the fear to be well-founded will vary with every claim.
There is no litmus test that determines when the fear becomes well-founded. This determi-
nation is left to the process of case-by-case adjudication. Id. at 1222.
209. 805 F.2d 60.
210. Id. at 64.
211. Id.
212. 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1565 (1987).
213. Id.
214. This reasonable person standard is evidently borrowed from the law of torts. The
doctrine, as applied in this field, includes the element of reasonable foreseeability. Foresee-
ability, in turn, has the attribute of reasonable anticipation of harm. It is this latter articula-
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requirement, determines whether the evidence presented provides
the alien with "good reason to fear . . .persecution."21" 5 In other
words, "good reason" is synonymous with circumstances which es-
tablish that persecution of the alien can be anticipated upon re-
turn to his country. This formulation produces a "reasonable antic-
ipation of persecution" standard.
Of course, consideration must be given to the context in which
the alien finds himself. The reasonable person analysis "should be
sensitive to the position into which the person is, hypothetically,
being placed." '21 Thus, under the more generous well-founded fear
standard, "a reasonable person could have a well-founded fear of
persecution even where the objective reality is that the likelihood
of persecution is under fifty percent.1
2 17
Undoubtedly prompted by the Supreme Court's decision in
Stevic, the BIA in Acosta undertook an extensive analysis of the
political asylum standard of proof. The BIA's examination of the
standard led it to equate the well-foundedness requirement with a
"realistic likelihood" of persecution. 2" Noting, however, that the
terminology varied among the Circuit Courts of Appeals,19 the
BIA dismissed any differences in diction to the extent that these
variations approached a "plausibility" of persecution.22
After discussing the kind of objective facts necessary to estab-
lish a realistic likelihood of persecution, the BIA derived a four-
part test that considered221 whether: (1) the alien possesses a char-
acteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome by punishing individuals
who possess it; (2) a persecutor is aware or could easily become
aware the alien possesses this characteristic; (3) a persecutor has
the capacity to punish the alien; and (4) a persecutor has the incli-
tion which renders the reasonable person doctrine particularly applicable under the well-
founded fear analysis.
215. Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasis supplied).
216. Carcarno-Flores, 805 F.2d at 68.
217. Id. See supra text accompanying note 207-08.
218. Acosta, No. 2986 at 23.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. In Acosta, because the BIA concluded that both the withholding of deportation
and granting of asylum standards were the same, it found that an alien was required to
demonstrate each factor. This proof would rise to a level of clear probability, thereby ignor-
ing the more generous standard of an asylum claim. The authors opine, however, that
merely allowing an alien to demonstrate a "realistic likelihood" that the events will occur -




nation to punish the alien.2 '
These four factors, while useful to an immigration judge and
an appellate court, must be considered carefully. As components of
a "reasonable anticipation," or more accurately "reasonable appre-
hension," analysis, the generosity of the well-founded fear stan-
dard must be preserved. Because the standard to apply is one of
reasonableness, these four factors may be demonstrated with less
than a fifty percent likelihood of occurrence. Consequently, the
lack of evidence on one factor should not be determinative of an
alien's claim for asylum.
(a) The Alien Possesses a Characteristic a Persecutor Seeks
to Overcome by Punishment
At first blush, this factor seems to require more than a fifty
percent likelihood of occurrence. After all, one either possesses a
characteristic, or one does not. But, such a dichotomous approach
misses the mark. Certainly, in all cases, the characteristic which a
persecutor seeks to overcome will become evident once the acts of
persecution are identified.2 23 Whether an alien possesses that char-
acteristic, however, may not be as apparent. In Acosta, for exam-
ple, the alien, a taxidriver, claimed persecution as a person en-
gaged in the transportation industry of El Salvador." 4 This
characteristic was easily verifiable. On the other hand, had Acosta
suggested persecution because of his political opinion, then the de-
termination regarding this characteristic would require a more de-
tailed inquiry.
Clearly, the characteristic proffered by an alien at this point
will also impact on the analysis of persecution "on account of' the
five categories in the statute.2 25 At this level, the existence of the
characteristic is only an evidentiary requirement. Its legal suffi-
222. Acosta, No. 2986 at 25. Acosta held that the standards under sections 208(a) and
243(h) merge in practical application. Id. To the extent this holding conflicts with the Su-
preme Court decision in Cardoza-Fonseca, it is, of course, overruled. However, it is only the
result reached in Acosta that is incorrect. The BIA analysis remains valid because it specifi-
cally recognized the standards to be different. It is only in application that they converge.
Id. at 25. Accordingly, these factors survive Cardoza-Fonseca.
223. This assumes, of course, that persecutors are rational, that is, that they are not
randomly selecting citizens of the country and engaging in some sort of self-serving punish-
ment. Instead, there will likely be a discernible pattern of persecution that evidences some
characteristic common to those persecuted. The shared trait must be more than merely be-
ing a citizen of the country and being subject to the general war-torn condition in the coun-
try. See Aviles-Torres v. INS, 790 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986).
224. Acosta, No. 2986 at 29.
225. See infra text accompanying notes 267-92.
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ciency is tested at a later stage of analysis. For this reason, the
alien's identification of a characteristic should be accepted unless
it appears to be patently frivolous. Otherwise, the immigration
judge or the court may prematurely and needlessly conduct an in-
quiry into the reasons for persecution when ultimately the fear
may not prove to be well-founded.""
(b) Persecutor is Aware or Could Easily Become Aware the
Alien Possesses the Characteristic
2 7
In a companion case, Ganjour v. INS,2 8 an Iranian nonimmi-
grant student, Feridon Fathi, applied for asylum and a withholding
of deportation. The Fifth Circuit, in affirming the BIA's denial of
relief under both claims, focused on Fathi's involvement in an anti-
Khomeini group while in the United States. The court found his
involvement in the group to be "informal and spasmodic."2 2 Fur-
ther, Fathi's involvement in the group and in demonstrations did
not indicate that "he would likely be brought to the attention of
the Khomeini government. . . . and [he] did nothing to specifi-
cally call attention to himself. 2 30 In effect, the court found that
Fathi had not come to the attention of the government, nor was it
likely that he would. Similarly, in examining Fathi's claim that his
family was threatened by pro-Khomeini supporters in the United
States, the court could find no involvement by Iranian officials.2"
Thus, Ganjour makes it clear that while possessing a punishable
characteristic places the alien in the group of persons subject to
persecution, it is the persecutor's awareness, or likelihood of
awareness, that is the focus of the analysis. An alien's inability to
provide evidence in this regard, however, should not invalidate the
226. For example, an alien "may have concealed his political opinion and never have
suffered any discrimination or persecution . . . In such circumstances the test of well-
founded fear would be based on an assessment of the consequences that an applicant having
certain political dispositions would have to face if he returned." HANDaOOK, supra note 144
at 20. The determination must be made "by a careful consideration of the circumstances."
See HANDBOOK, supra note 144 at 22. Thus, if the alien's possession of the characteristic is
questioned at this point, the analysis would overlap with the remaining Acosta factors, see
infra text accompanying notes 227-58, and may have been needlessly undertaken if the fear
is determined not to be well-founded.
227. The alien need not actually possess the characteristic. It is sufficient that the per-
secutor believe that he does. Certainly, the persecution does not become any less likely if
the alien is not whom the persecutor believes him to be. The persecution will occur
nonetheless.
228. 796 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1986).
229. Id. at 836.
230. Id. (emphasis supplied).
231. Id. at 837.
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claim where there is a likelihood that the persecutor can become
aware of the alien.
One method by which persecutors become aware of dissidents
is through an information system that reports to official authori-
ties. In Farzad v. INS'23 2 the Fifth Circuit considered the effect of
such a "spy system." Farzad was another nonimmigrant student
that argued that his participation in demonstrations and lectures
against the Khomeini regime was reported to Iranian officials
through a "spy system." ' To support his claim, a police official
from Farzad's university testified as to the hostility between pro-
Khomeini and anti-Khomeini groups. The court found that
Farzad's involvement "without more, [did] not establish that his
identity as a dissident ha[d] become known to Iranian authori-
ties."'2 " The court, in its per curiam decision, alsQ found that the
district court certainly had the correct standard in mind, although
parts of its opinion may suggest otherwise. 20 To the extent that
Farzad requires proof that the alien is a target of the persecutor, it
would eliminate the more generous burden under an asylum claim.
The decision, however, is useful in that it discloses the existence of
a mechanism - the spy system - by which the persecutor may
become aware of the alien.
Of course, awareness by the government rising to a level of
direct interest in an alien will, in and of itself, establish a well-
founded fear. The court, in Guevara-Flores v. INS,236 adopted this
approach. Ana Guevara-Flores was apprehended by the Texan
Border Patrol and later suspected by the FBI to be Commandante
Norma, a Salvadorian guerilla leader.23 7 Fingerprint cards of Com-
mandante Norma, obtained from Salvadorian authorities, revealed
that the woman's identity had been mistaken. Nonetheless, the
Salvadorian government indicated that possession of such subver-
sive literature was a crime for which she could be detained upon
her return.2 88 Consequently, the authorities requested, in the event
of her deportation, that they be provided with the date and num-
232. 802 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1986).
233. Id. at 125.
234. Id.
235. Farad's claim that the BIA had confused the standards of proof specifically was
rejected. The court discounted any such possible error by the BIA because Farzad had failed
to meet the more generous reasonable person standard. Id.
236. 786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1565 (1987).




ber of her flight, as well as copies of the documents she carried.2"
The Fifth Circuit held that a reasonable person in her circum-
stances would fear persecution because Salvadorian authorities had
"personally taken an interest in her case. 2 4 0
In sum, the level of awareness by the persecuting authority, or
its ability to become aware, are critical to an alien's case. Actual
awareness seems to warrant the immediate conclusion that the
alien has proven his case. Alternatively, the fact that the persecu-
tor has no contemporaneous knowledge of the alien should not
work against him. The focus of the inquiry is on the reasonable
likelihood that the persecutor could easily become aware of the
alien. In this respect, an alien's activities, both inside and outside
his country, must be carefully evaluated.
(c) The Persecutor Has the Capacity to Punish the Alien
This factor will be easily proved by an alien. For the most
part, either the official government, a defacto power, or a guerilla
group, is conducting the persecutions. The persecution is "nor-
mally related to action by the authorities of a country,""4 1 whether
the authority is the official government or not. General evidence of
the activity by such groups will be documented by newspaper or
other media. The ability to punish, however, need not be direct. A
persecutor's capacity to punish is not rendered any less effective
merely because it elects agents to impose its measures of
discrimination.
(d) The Persecutor Has the Inclination to Punish the Alien
Adopting a dictionary definition, an "inclination" to punish
indicates the persecutor has "[a] disposition more favorable to one
. . . person than to another."24 " An alien must therefore show a
reasonable likelihood that he or she will be punished, as distinct
from the random or general upheaval occurring in the country;
that the alien's "situation upon . . . return . . . will be . . . differ-
ent from the dangers faced by other citizens .... ",'
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits interpret the well-foundedness
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1250. Because Guevara was attempting to reopen her case, the court ex-
pressed no opinion on the merits of her claim. Id. It merely held that she had met the prima
facie showing that "she is likely to meet the statutory requirements on remand." Id. at
1250-51.
241. HANDBOOK, supra note 144 at 17.
242. THE WEBSTER REFERENCE DICTION AY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 485 (1983).
243. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1581 (9th Cir. 1986).
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standard to impose on the alien a burden to demonstrate an indi-
vidualized claim. This requirement is analogous to proof of the
persecutor's disposition toward punishing the alien over others. In
Bahramnia v. INS,2 4 4 the Fifth Circuit examined yet another Ira-
nian student's request for political asylum. Bahramnia contended
that his membership in a group committed to the ouster of the
Khomeini government, and his participation in demonstrations
and discussions gave rise to a well-founded fear of persecution.2
5
The court found that Bahramnia had not demonstrated:
any nexus between his membership in this organization and
other acts or persecution that would give rise to the reasonable
foreseeability that he will be persecuted .... No evidence was
submitted to suggest that supporters of the Iranian regime have
taken action against him in the United States, or that any of his
family members in Iran have been harmed in any way on ac-
count of their association with him.2"
The court's opinion indicates that the inclination to punish
can be manifested in two ways. Direct persecution of the alien in
the past or a "good reason" to anticipate future persecution shows
such an inclination. 24 7 Alternatively, persecution can occur to an
alien's family members. Since his family has been punished "on
account of their association" with the alien,248 the alien's claim
that he will be "singled-out for persecution" still remains individu-
alized because the family's persecution is imputed to the alien. It is
persecution of the family as a unit which necessarily implicates the
alien.
24 19
This "individualized claim" has been similarly embraced by
the Ninth Circuit. In Vides-Vides v. INS, 50 the court reasoned
that the objective component of the well-founded fear standard in-
cluded evidence that "should be specific enough to indicate that
the alien's predicament is appreciably different from the dangers
faced by the alien's fellow citizens."'2 5 1 Two succeeding cases con-
tinue to affirm the court's position.
244. 782 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1986).
245. Id. at 1248.
246. Id. (emphasis supplied).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See in/ra note 282 and accompanying text (discussing family status as member-
ship in a social group).
250. 783 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1986).
251. Id. at 1469 (citation omitted).
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In Rebollo-Jovel v. INS,252 the court expressly stated that
"[tio qualify for political asylum, Rebollo-Jovel must demonstrate
that potential persecution would be directed at him as an individ-
ual. . . .We have repeatedly 'rejected the contention that a citi-
zen' of El Salvador can establish eligibility for asylum merely by
pointing out that political violence is widespread there.' "23 Simi-
larly, in Sanchez- Trujillo v. INS,"54 the court echoed the immigra-
tion judge's conclusion that neither petitioner established facts to
distinguish their claim from the dangers faced by other citizens of
the country.2""
An initial interpretation of this factor could lead one to con-
clude that imposing such a burden on the alien exacts a standard
of proof equal to, if not greater than, the clear probability stan-
dard. It must be emphasized, however, that such is not the case.
The apparent similarity and certain confusion occurs because of "a
few inartfully chosen words." '56 The discussion in Sanchez-Tru-
jillo reveals the sine qua non.
The use of one particular word is not dispositive of whether the
proper standard was applied . . . . "There is clearly a substan-
tial difference between a demand that the alien demonstrate
that []he would be persecuted if deported, and a demand that
the alien demonstrate that []he has a well-founded fear that
[]he would be persecuted.9M
7
Thus, the alien need only demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that
he or she will be persecuted upon return. In the absence of corrob-
orative evidence, it can be established through the alien's specific,
consistent, objective, and credible testimony." 8
2. The "Fear" of "Persecution"
"Fear" is the motive for an alien's flight. The instinct for sur-
vival has delivered the alien to this country. "Persecution," on the
252. 794 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1986).
253. Id. at 448 (citations omitted) (quoting Sarvia Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387,
1394 (9th Cir. 1985)).
254. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
255. "[N]one of the incidents related by either petitioner appears to be 'a result of any
specific effort aimed at them in particular . Id. at 1581.
256. Id. at 1579.
257. Id. at 1579. (quoting Florez-De Solis v. INS, 796 F.2d 330, 336 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Wallace, J., concurring)).
258. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
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other hand, is the catalyst. It is the instigator to the flight which
leaves behind country, and often family. The evidence of fear is
subjective; it is individual and testimonial in nature. Persecution,
however, can be objectively evaluated.
Fear is a state of mind characterized by an anticipation or
awareness of danger. 259 Its subjective character allows it to be "il-
lusory, neurotic, or paranoid."1 0 Thus, the only essential require-
ment is that the fear be genuine.26" ' A mere declaration by an alien
will suffice, since fear is incapable of rational measurement.262
Additionally, the basis of an alien's fear will vary. It may be
individual, such as being branded a guerilla,"e or being forced to
join the military.2"4 Or, the fear may stem from group characteris-
tics, such as religion,26 5 political opinion,2 0 or membership in a so-
cial group.2 76 Ultimately, the only requirement is the presence of
fear in the alien's mind.
On the other hand, "persecution" is the reason for the fear.
"[T]he term encompasses 'the infliction of suffering or harm upon
those who differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way
regarded as offensive'. '268 Implicitly, a "persecution" occurs as a
pattern of repetition. Otherwise, an alien is encouraged to claim
every single act of violence, no matter how minor or isolated, as an
act of persecution. Of course, the particular facts of each case will
be critical to this determination. If the credible evidence demon-
strates that the alien was captured, tortured, and released by the
persecutor, then this showing should be sufficient. An alien does
not need to be a victim of persecution in order to establish its exis-
tence. Past persecution or the threat of future persecution - as
259. Acosta, No. 2986 at 14.
260. Dunar, I. & N. Dec. No. 2192 (BIA April 17, 1973). Of course, a fear of this nature
will not survive the well-foundedness requirement. Id.
261. Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986).
262. See Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986). "Mere assertions
of possible fear" will always be insufficient. Shogee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir.
1983) (emphasis supplied).
263. See Aviles-Torres v. INS, 790 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986).
264. Vides-Vides, 783 F.2d at 1466.
265. Dawood-Haio v. INS, 800 F.2d 90, 96 (6th Cir. 1986).
266. See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984). See infra text ac-
companying notes 285-92.
267. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1573 (9th Cir. 1986). See infra text accom-
panying notes 269-86.
268. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Kovac v. INS,
407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969)).
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distinguished from general upheaval or chance occurence - will
establish the existence of "persecution." The inquiry then turns to
whether the persecution was "on account of" the five statutory
factors.
3. "On Account of"
As used in the Act, this language and that which follows it
represent words of limitation. Thus, they necessarily place condi-
tions on the alien's claim. The "fear of persecution" can only ema-
nate from the five statutory categories: race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, and political opinion.
(a) Membership in a Particular Social Group
' 9
In developing a workable definition for this category, the
Handbook would seem to be a logical starting point. Unfortu-
nately, its discussion of this factor is insubstantial and provides
good advice. In general terms, membership in this group is by
"persons of similar backgrounds, habits, or social status. ' 270 "Mere
membership in a particular social group will not normally be
enough to substantiate a claim for refugee status" unless there ex-
ists "special circumstances." 27 1 The Handbook however, does not
identify the "special circumstances" upon which to base a claim for
refugee status.
In Sanchez- Trujillo v. INS,2 72 the Ninth Circuit attempted to
trace the "outer limits" of this phrase. From this otherwise ambig-
uous category, the court developed a four-part test to be used in
determining whether eligibility for group classification and mem-
bership exists. The court looked to whether:
(1) The class of people identified by the applicant is cognizable
269. A discussion of the three other categories, race, religion and nationality, has been
omitted. Generally, persecution on account of these reasons will be so widespread as to be
easily corroborated. Moreover, an alien should have no difficulty in proving that he pos-
sesses any one of these characteristics. See Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1336-37 (9th
Cir. 1986) (Sandinistas persecution of readily identifiable Miskito Indians characterized as
"genocide"). Where an alien's statements regarding persecution do not rise to the level of
being on account of race, religion, or nationality, specific threats to the alien may provide a
fall back position. See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) (spe-
cific threat not lessened by the fact that individual resides in country where many persons
threatened).
270. HANDBOOK, supra note 144 at 77.
271. HANDBOOK, supra note 144 at 79.
272. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
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as a "particular social group" under the immigration statutes;27 8
(2) The applicant has established that he qualifies as a member
of the group;2 4 (3) The purported social group was in fact
targeted for persecution on account of the characteristics of the
group members;275 and (4) "Special circumstances" necessitate
that mere membership in the social group constitutes per se eli-
gibility for asylum or withhold of deportation.2 7
In determining the cognizability of a group, the Ninth Circuit
noted that there must be close affiliation with other members of
the group as well as common interests shared between them.
27 7 It
is the "cohesive, homogeneous group" to which the term applies.22
Sanchez-Trujillo had sought asylum on account of persecution be-
cause of his membership in the group of young, urban working
class males. In framing his claim in this manner, the court found
that the group was too broad and possessed too many diverse life-
styles, interests, and political leanings.2 ' To the court, this group
represented little more than another "[m]ajor segment[] of the
population of an embattled nation."280 General upheaval in the
country again played a significant role.28
The few cases discussing the applicability of a "particular so-
cial group" claim have one unifying theme: the group characteris-
tics should be immutable and beyond the control of its mem-
bers.2 8 2 The Sanchez-Trujillo court implied that the size of the
273. Id. at 1574.
274. Id. at 1574-75.
275. Id. at 1575.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1576.
278. Id. at 1577.
279. Id. (citing decision of immigration judge).
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., Aviles-Torres v. INS, 790 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing war
torn conditions in country). It is worth noting that although a group claim may not succeed,
the alien is not foreclosed from having his individual circumstances evaluated. Sanchez-
Trujillo v. INS 1577, 1578 (9th Cir. 1986). This option is available because many of the
group characteristics may overlap with the other statutory grounds. See Sanchez and Esco-
bar, I. & N. Dec. No. 2996 at 15 (BIA Oct. 15, 1985).
282. The BIA, in Acosta-Solorzano, Interim Decision No. (BIA Mar. 1, 1985), noted
that:
Membership of [sic] such a particular social group may be at the root of
persecution because there is no confidence in the group's loyalty to the Gover-
ment or because the political outlook, antecedents or economic activities of its
members, or the very existence of the social group as such, is held to be an
obstacle to the Government's policies.
Id. at 10. The court found that the characteristic may be "so fundamental to individual
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group may also be a factor, noting that a family would be a "proto-
typical example" because it was "a small readily identifiable
group. "283
Thus, the emphasis lies with the uniqueness of common char-
acteristics which set the group apart from the general population.
As the number of characteristics increases, it becomes simpler for
anyone to claim association with the group, and consequently, the
group becomes larger in size. Likewise, broad categories of inter-
ests would also permit more persons to establish affiliation. The
successful applicant must identify a relatively small group of per-
sons with distinct characteristics in order to avoid "falling within
the parameters of [a] sweeping demographic division. '2 4 Other-
wise, the alien will be unable to establish a prima facie case, partic-
ularly in light of the dearth of authority construing the meaning of
this term.
The structuring of an asylum application on the basis of group
status does not abrogate the necessity to demonstrate the existence
of an "individualized" claim. In this context, the only difference is
that the individualization extends to a particular social group in-
stead of a particular person.28 5 The basis of the alien's claim must
be that the group persecuted has "specific indentifying characteris-
tics and its treatment based on those characteristics is distinct
from that of the general population." '
(b) Political Opinion
Naturally, persecution based on political belief takes place be-
cause of the instability and conflict in the alien's country. It ordi-
narily occurs because of the alien's loyalty to other governmental
factions, or because of lack of loyalty to the government in power.
In determining whether persecution has, or may occur on account
of an alien's political opinion, the motivations of both the alien
and the persecutor may be examined, as well as the relationship
identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed." Id. at 24 (citations
omitted).
283. 801 F.2d at 1576 (citing Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS., 777 F.2d 509, 515 (9th Cir.
1985)). Threats against an alien or members of his family have traditionally supported the
conclusion that the aliens' life or freedom is endangered. See, e.g., Hernandez-Ortiz, 777
F.2d at 516) (But expressly leaving open the issue of a family as "particular social group."
Id. at 517 n.8); Garcia-Ramos v. INS.. 775 F.2d 1373, 1374 (9th Cir. 1985).
284. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577.
285. See id.




Political affiliation may be active or passive. In Bolanos-Her-
nandez v. INS,2 88 the court recognized that the decision to remain
neutral can be a decision of political conscience." 9 Bolanos-Her-
nandez had sought political asylum after he received death threats
from guerillas whom he had declined to join.90 The court reasoned
that:
[w]hen a person is aware of contending political forces and af-
firmatively chooses not to join any faction, that choice is a polit-
ical one. A rule that one must identify with one or two dominant
warring political factions in order to possess a political opinion,
when many persons may, in fact, be opposed to the views and
policies of both, would frustrate one of the basic objectives of
the Refugee Act of 1980 - to provide protection to all victims
of persecution regardless of ideology.291
A significant contribution by the court was its finding that the
alien's reasons for choosing to join or not join a group are of no
importance to the political opinion analysis. The individual's
choice could not be a factor because to the persecutor, the alien's
motivation is irrelevant.29 2 To the court, a persecutor would not
question the alien, and is merely concerned with the "act[s] that
constitute an overt manifestation of a political opinion.
' '
129 Politi-
cal neutrality, however, must be distinguished from apathy. The
alien must make an affirmative choice to remain neutral.29 4 The
alien's failure however, to take a political position will prevent him
from prevailing on this claim. 295
V. CONCLUSION
The line between the clear probability and the well-founded
287. Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 516.
288. 749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984).
289. Id. at 1324-25.
290. Id. at 1318.
291. Id. at 1325.
292. Id. at 1287.
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., Lopez v. INS. 775 F.2d 1015, 1016 (9th Cir. 1985) and cases cited therein.
295. Where an alien demonstrates that he is a "refugee" under the first three factors,
see supra text accompanying note 187, then the fourth factor - the alien's inability or
unwillingness to return - may be presumed because the application for asylum is a clear
manifestation of the alien's unwillingness to return.
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fear standards has been, at best, blurry. While it is clear that the
two standards differ, the INS and the courts have been less than
certain with their application of the well-founded fear test. The
BIA, responding to the Supreme Court decision in Stevic, found
that in practice the two standards were indistinguishable. The
BIA's decision in Acosta provided four factors to be evaluated in
the determination of a "well-founded" fear. The courts, nonethe-
less, continue to struggle to such extent that even improper word
choice by the BIA could effect a remand.
The well-founded fear standard of section 208(a) combines a
subjective and objective element of proof. Although this standard
must be applied on a case-by-case basis, the very existence of an
objective burden of proof necessitates a framework of analysis that
can guide the INS and the courts to a proper conclusion. This
framework was provided by the BIA in Acosta. Without the use of
an objective framework, the asylum analyis reduces itself to a bal-
ancing process. The only certainty to be expected from this ap-
proach is the arbitrariness that will result in applying the well-
founded fear standard.29 If the humanitarian concerns of the Ref-
ugee Act of 1980 are to be given effect, the state of flux regarding
this standard must be settled.
The factors enumerated in Acosta provide the means by which
the reasonable person standard can be applied, in like manner, to
every alien. The decisions evaluating political asylum claims have
considered: an alien's possession of a characteristic a persecutor
seeks out; a persecutor's awareness or likelihood of becoming aware
that the alien possesses this characteristic; a persecutor's capacity
to punish the alien; and a persecutor's inclination to punish the
alien. There is no valid reason for the sporadic use of these factors.
Only their consistent application will remove speculative judgment
regarding the existence and degree of an alien's persecution. Addi-
tionally, the uncertainty directly impacts the alien's presentation
of his case. The alien already contends with the handicaps of a
language barrier, nervousness, and being compelled to use an inter-
preter. He should not be additionally burdened with uncertainty in
the manner by which his evidence is construed. A framework that
evaluates objective facts allows the alien to gather and present his
296. Note, The "Political Propaganda" Label Under FARA: Abridgement of Free
Speech or Legitimate Regulation?, 41 U. MtAMi L. REv. 591, 613 (1987) (ad hoc character of




evidence in a manner specifically tailored for the court's analysis.
In short, an objective framework substantially removes guesswork
from the perspective of both the court and the alien.
The United States has continually demonstrated its role as a
safe harbor, sensitive to the plight of those who flee their country
when human rights violations can no longer be tolerated. This
open door policy carries with it the realization that certain stan-
dards must be met because refuge cannot be offered to all those
who seek it. Thus, the Refugee Act of 1980 and the case law inter-
preting it attempt to define the width of the doorway to this coun-
try. The courts, however, by their inconsistent application of the
well-founded fear standard have constructed a revolving door,
leaving aliens uncertain about which way it swings. Only an objec-
tive framework of analysis can guarantee a "realistic likelihood" of
evenhandedness in the application of the well-founded fear stan-
dard. Otherwise, the offer of refuge to aliens "simply sound[s] the
word of promise to the ear but break[s] it to the hope." '297
HUMBERTO H. OCARIZ
JORGE L. LOPEZ
297. Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 628 (1st Cir. 1985).
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